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ABSTRACT 
One main quandary that emerges in the context of Immanuel Kant’s moral ideal, The High-
est Good, is that on the one hand Kant sets it as a moral demand, that is, as a principle that 
must be comprehended as an attainable end for man in practice while, on the other hand, it 
is set as a moral ideal, i.e. as something that cannot be concretized and realized within the 
empirical world. The main goal of this paper is to argue for the realizability of the moral 
ideal by means of the principle of reflective judgment as a form of judgment that in fact 
clarifies human limitation. I assert that the very recognition of this limitation constitutes the 
possibility for hope in that ideal, or for striving towards it, and that this striving is the only 
way that the moral ideal can be concretized. I examine man’s recognition of self-limitation 
as a response to the moral demand to realize the moral ideal and the necessity of the power 
of imagination for this, used reflectively. 
Keywords: culture, final end, Highest Good, hope, imagination, Kant, moral ideal reflective 
judgment, ultimate end. 
RESUMO
Um dos principais dilemas que surge no contexto do ideal moral de Immanuel Kant, O Bem 
Supremo, é que, por um lado, Kant o define como uma demanda moral, isto é, como um prin-
cípio que deve ser compreendido como um fim possível para o homem na prática enquanto, 
por outro lado, é definido como um ideal moral, ou seja, como algo que não pode ser concre-
tizado e realizado dentro do mundo empírico. O objetivo principal deste artigo é argumentar 
pela realizabilidade do ideal moral por meio do princípio do juízo reflexivo como uma forma 
de julgamento que de fato esclarece a limitação humana. Afirmo que o próprio reconheci-
mento dessa limitação constitui a possibilidade da esperança neste ideal, ou para alcançá-lo, 
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Introduction 
One of the most puzzling terms in Immanuel Kant’s 
pra ical philosophy is that of the Highest Good (henceforth: 
HG).3 HG is discussed in all three Critiques mutatis mutandis 
as the combination of happiness (or worthiness to be happy) 
and morality and is set as the ultimate end of human endeav-
or.4 One main quandary that emerges in this context is that, 
on the one hand, Kant sets the HG as a moral demand, that 
is, as a principle that must be comprehended as an attainable 
end for man in pra ice while, on the other hand, it is set as a 
moral ideal, i.e. as something that cannot be concretized and 
realized within the empirical world. 
The main goal of this paper is to argue for the realizabil-
ity of HG by means of the principle of reflective judgment 
as a form of judgment that in fact clarifies human limitation. 
I assert that the very recognition of this limitation constitutes 
the possibility for hope in HG, or for striving towards it, and 
that this striving is the only way that HG can be concretized. 
I examine man’s recognition of self-limitation as a response 
to the moral demand to realize HG, and the necessity of the 
power of imagination for this, used reflectively. I argue that 
precisely the reflective use of our imagination can, in pra ice, 
turn us into part of the ideal moral human community, as HG 
demands,5 in spite of the fact that such a community cannot 
be realized in any concrete representation.
By “reflective use of imagination”, I refer to the way 
man recognizes his ability to reshape nature by means of cul-
ture. Culture demonstrates human striving to give teleolog-
ical shape to nature as a whole, including to man himself as 
the ultimate end of nature in accordance with his cognitive 
powers. My emphasis will be on the manner in which man 
constructs himself as the ultimate end of nature by means of 
culture, which in fact regulates him to think about his moral 
development towards HG while, at the same time, entailing 
recognition of human limitation precisely because it involves 
reflection on our need to set an ideal final moral end and to 
strive towards it as a natural human inclination. 
I start with a general presentation to Kant’s doctrine of 
reflective judgment and point out the distinct function the 
power of imagination has in it. Then I present the difference 
between ultimate end and final end, contending that in order 
for man to recognize himself as the final end of nature (namely, 
his moral vocation) he needs a form of reflective judgment. 
Next I demonstrate the sense in which culture, as an ultimate 
end of nature, constitutes the ground for the final end and 
thus regulates man towards his moral duty to realize HG. 
Finally, I examine the recognition of the human need to give 
an ideal end to the entirety of human a ion as a basis for hope 
in the realizability of HG, and I point to the reflective use of 
imagination required for this.
Imagination and 
Reflective Judgment
In the fourth section of the introduction to the Critique 
of the Power of Judgment (CJ) Kant distinguishes between two 
types of judgments and describes them as follows:
If the universal (the rule, the principle, the 
law) is given, then the power of judgment, 
which subsumes the particular under it […] 
is determining. If, however, only the partic-
e que essa luta é a única maneira de concretizar o ideal moral. Examino o reconhecimento do 
homem da auto-limitação como uma resposta à demanda moral para realizar o ideal moral e 
a necessidade do poder da imaginação para isso, usado de forma reflexiva. 
Palavras-chave: cultura, fim final, bem supremo, esperança, imaginação, Kant, juízo moral 
reflexivo ideal, fim último.
3 The concept of “HG” (Summum Bonum) appears in all three Critiques and in many of Kant’s post-critical writings, mainly on history 
and religion. The multiple contexts in which Kant discusses this concept are often incompatible with one another and it is not clear 
whether it maintains the same significance at all times. For instance, in the Critique of Practical Reason Kant distinguishes between the 
“Supreme Good” (das höchste Gut) and “HG” (das oberste Gut) and argues that while the latter in itself is a condition for happiness, 
only the combination of both provides the complete understanding of the moral ideal as a Supreme Good. I will not go into the depth of 
Kant’s linguistic distinctions regarding HG in the present paper. Instead, I relate to it in its basic definition as the ultimate object or end 
of practical reason, i.e. as the combination of complete happiness and complete moral virtue. What interests me is not a logical or the-
oretical analyzation of HG, but the practical question of its realizability. For a detailed account of HG see: Engstrom (1992, p. 747-780). 
4 See for example: Kant (2000, CP, A810-811/B838-839, A813-814/B841-842); Kant (2002b, CPR, 5:107-141); Kant (2002a, CJ, 5:429-
436, 442-453).
5 The ideal community I refer to here as implied from HG is different from the idea of “the kingdom of ends” that Kant presents in the 
‘Second Critique’ (Kant, 2002b, CPR, 5:108) and in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (Kant, 1997, G, 4:439). For the king-
dom of ends refers to morality alone detached from any natural inclination such as happiness. While HG indicates an ideal world where 
“Happiness […] [is] in exact proportion with the morality of the rational beings who are thereby rendered worthy of it” (Kant, 2000, CP, 
A814/B842). I will argue that this ideal community is entwined with the idea of culture as presented in the ‘Third Critique’. 
Filosofi a Unisinos – Unisinos Journal of Philosophy – 18(2):107-115, may/aug 2017
The fi nal end of imagination: On the relationship between moral ideal and refl ectivity in Immanuel Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment 
109
ular is given, for which the universal is to be 
found, then the power of judgment is mere-
ly reflecting (Kant, 2002a, CJ, 5:179).
Kant discusses the determining power of judgment 
mainly in the Critique of Pure Reason (CP A/B). There he ex-
amines the transcendental conditions of our ability to make 
judgments on empirical objects of experience, that is, how we 
subsume empirical sense data under general a priori concepts. 
However, in the Critique of the Power of Judgment Kant raises 
a different unique sense of judgment: the reflecting power of 
judgment. Here, our judgment begins with a given particular 
and only then looks to give it a rule. In other words, instead of 
applying a determinate a priori concept to a particular case 
given in experience, in reflective judgments we should infer 
from the  ecific given case itself the rule that this case is sup-
posed to represent. 
Accordingly, the end of the judgment also varies. 
While determining judgments seek to determine the em-
pirical object under conceptual rules of the understanding, 
the purpose of reflective judgments is “to ground the unity 
of all empirical principles under equally empirical but high-
er principles” (Kant, 2002a, CJ, 5:180). Stated differently, 
reflective judgments seek to bring the systematic order giv-
en in experience towards a concept, and not the other way 
around as in determining judgments. The point is that the 
act of reflective judgment itself generates the rule according 
to which it is supposed to operate. In order for it to do this, 
Kant states that the power of reflective judgment must as-
sume a  ecial kind of concept that will serve as a guiding 
principle for the judgment: “the purposiveness of nature” 
[die Zweckmäßigkeit der Natur].
Stated very generally, Kant asserts that reflective judg-
ments are involved in certain requirements that are necessary 
to the way we reflect about nature. Hence, the principle of 
“the purposiveness of nature” becomes the condition for the 
correlation between human judgments on nature and nature 
itself. It transpires that we are not referring here to an actual 
reachable purpose or end but to reflective judgment itself as 
the power to comprehend the possibility of an end in general. 
Put differently, when judging reflectively we must compre-
hend nature through the principle of “the purposiveness of 
nature” in order for the judgment to be implemented. How-
ever, because this principle is not based on our objective ex-
perience in nature, as noted, its status is subjective. It follows 
that reflective judgments refer to the ability of the subject to 
give a rule to herself through the application of her reflection 
on nature.6 The point is that although this rule is subjective it 
nevertheless stands as a necessary assumption that constructs 
the manner in which we must judge nature in order for it to 
conform with our faculties of cognition.  
Here is where the power of imagination comes into view: 
instead of serving as a mediator between sensibility and the 
understanding, as it does in determining judgments, in reflec-
tive judgments imagination provides a sensible representation 
of the subject’s state of mind while performing the judgment. 
In other words, while in determining judgments imagination 
provides a representation related to an object that leads to a 
determination of that object, in reflective judgments the rep-
resentation given by imagination is determining the subject 
and her feeling in the act of judging (Kant, 2002a, CJ, First 
Introduction, 20:223). Put differently, instead of providing us 
with objective representation, imagination in reflective judg-
ment gives us a mental representation of the manner in which 
we are able to make judgments in the first place.7
This representation is unique because it does not pres-
ent any  ecific content in intuition; instead it presents only 
the form according to which we perform judgments: the form 
of purposiveness. Therefore, in order to assume that nature is 
indeed organized in a way that is compatible with our cogni-
tion, we must be able to represent in our imagination a prin-
ciple of pure purposiveness, i.e., purposiveness as a mode or 
form of a ivity, through which we can reorganize nature and 
apply general concepts to it.8 
For the purpose of the present article, pointing to the 
involvement of imagination in the principle of “the purpo-
siveness of nature” helps to emphasize the reflective a ect of 
judgment as an a ivity that relates to how we represent the 
conditions of our possibility of thinking both nature as purpo-
sive and ourselves as its ultimate end. The main point I would 
like to argue is that through the ability to think nature purpo-
sively a space is opened for us to think also our moral purpos-
es, such as HG, as pra ically possible. I wish now to elaborate 
on the relationship between natural and moral purposiveness. 
In particular, I would like to dwell on the connection between 
ultimate and final end in the teleological nexus in which they 
appear in the second part of the ‘Third Critique’.
 
Ultimate End and Final End
Unlike the Critique of Pra ical Reason (CPR), where 
Kant discusses the moral ideal of HG regarding the individ-
ual, the discussion of HG in the Critique of the Power of Judg-
ment relates to humanity as a whole. The emphasis is on the 
fact that, while from a purely pra ical per ective man is 
6 Kant names this ability “Heautonomy” [Heautonomie]. See: Kant (2002a, CJ, 5:186).
7 In what follows we shall see how this reflective use of imagination is used in relation to objective natural ends within the teleological 
context. There, the weight will be on imagination’s ability to provide the subject with a representation of her need to give a teleological 
form to nature as a whole and to the self-reflection accompanying it.    
8 I am not referring in this context to the free play between imagination and the understanding in the aesthetic judgment of beauty, but 
rather to the human capacity to freely set ends in nature. This sense of purposiveness as a form of activity that allows us to reorganize 
nature is best illustrated through the idea of culture, as I will demonstrate ahead.
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described as an end-in-itself and, consequently, as being a fi-
nite end apart from nature, the per ective of reflective judg-
ment proposed in the ‘Third Critique’ illustrates the way that 
human purposiveness can be fully connected with the purpo-
siveness of nature.
The connection between the principle of purposiveness 
and reflective judgment finds its clearest articulation in the 
second part of the ‘Third Critique’, “the Critique of the Tele-
ological Power of Judgment”. Here, Kant no longer discusses 
the idea of purposiveness without an end, as he did in the first 
part, “the Critique of the Aesthetic Power of Judgment”. Rath-
er, he focusses on the purposiveness of nature as a real objective 
end (Kant, 2002a, CJ, 5:194).9 Let us recall that the idea of 
purposiveness without an end is a key principle of aesthetic 
judgment in that it constitutes an essential premise regarding 
the existence of systematicity in nature in order for us to be 
able to judge it.10 The point is that, in spite of being an essen-
tial premise its status remains subjective, as stated earlier, and 
therefore Kant connects it to judgments of taste. In contrast, 
teleological judgments, although they too belong to a form of 
reflective judgment, generate assertions regarding the objective 
purposiveness of nature, namely, regarding objects that we 
necessarily judge as purposeful and consequently are no lon-
ger connected to taste but rather to the concepts of under-
standing and reason.
Kant asserts that certain natural processes can only be 
fully understood when, in addition to an explanation ground-
ed on purely mechanical causality, they are also described in 
terms of purposiveness.11 Stated differently, Kant points out 
that the explanations by which we determine things in nature 
on the basis of our theoretical reason are in need of comple-
mentation by means of reflective judgments that also relate to 
the purposes of these things. This complementation is mani-
fe ed in the teleological principle of natural purposiveness.12
In his “Appendix to Critique of the Teleological Pow-
er of Judgment”, Kant presents two separate ends of nature, 
‘ultimate end’ [letzter Zweck] and ‘final end’ [Endzweck]. The 
first refers to the highest end of nature and is conditional on 
other ends that preceded it, while the second refers to an end 
“which needs no other [end] as a condition of its possibility”, 
and refers to the moral end (Kant, 2002a, CJ, 5:434). Kant de-
velops the idea of an ‘ultimate end’ by addressing the objective 
purposiveness of nature as a system of ends. The emphasis is 
on the ability to grasp nature as purposively organized as an 
ability that is unique to man. For us to be able to grasp how the 
mechanical mode of operation of the laws of nature works in 
harmony with the essential order of the phenomena of nature 
as we human beings grasp them, we must assume that nature 
has an underlying holistic structure, as if all of nature were 
organized “in accordance with final causes” (Kant, 2002a, CJ, 
5:434). In other words, for us to be able to grasp the diverse 
natural mechanical processes occurring in nature in accor-
dance with the way that we think of the organisms in it, we 
must assume the concept of ‘end’.13 That is the only way we 
can grasp nature, “given”, in Kant’s words, “the nature of our 
understanding and our reason” (Kant, 2002a, CJ, 5:434).
It is important to stress here that in assuming a natu-
ral purposiveness we are not imposing a transcendental in-
terpretation on nature, as though there were a real regula-
tive purpose beyond it. Rather, we are talking of a necessary 
methodological premise that allows us to reflect on nature as 
an object of knowledge. That is, we are talking of a princi-
ple of reflective judgment (Kant, 2002a, CJ, 5:429). Man is 
set as the ultimate end of nature. Kant explains this by the 
assertion that man “is the only being on earth who forms a 
concept of ends for himself and who by means of his reason 
can make a system of ends out of an aggregate of purposively 
formed things” (Kant, 2002a, CJ, 5:426-7). Kant asserts that 
only man can refer to nature as a system because it is only he 
who provides the foundation around which that system can 
be created in the first place. That is to say, since man is the 
only organism in nature who raises the question of the pur-
posiveness of its other organisms and who can use them as 
means for his own ends, this leads man to reflection on nature 
as a whole system whose apex is he himself. Therefore, it fol-
lows that the purposiveness of nature as a system entails an 
inseparable connection with the purposiveness of man, given 
that the very ability of man to think and to direct his behavior 
purposively constitutes the condition for his being the ultimate 
end of nature. 
However, although man constitutes the ultimate end of 
nature, he cannot, for all that, also serve as a final end of the 
existence of that very nature in the literal sense of the word. 
The main reason for this lies in the fact that man is a natu-
9 It is important to note that although this is an objective end, the form of teleological judgment does not constitute a condition for the 
ontological possibility of this end as something that exists materially within nature. Instead, it refers to the ways in which the subject 
relates a priori to the structure of nature and places objects within it.
10 See above “Imagination and Reflective Judgment”.
11 It should be emphasized that although Kant discusses here natural processes, the reference is more to nature in a psychological and 
sociological sense and less in the sense of material nature. For the empirical nature in which the moral ideal of HG is supposed to be 
embodied is composed first and foremost of interpersonal relations and social institutions.
12 “The principle of the purposiveness of nature” described in the introduction can be considered the ground for the teleological prin-
ciple of natural purposiveness.
13 One of Kant’s famous examples in this context is that of the watch: Kant asserts that without assuming the concept of purpose it is 
impossible to understand the organism as a whole and the connection between its parts. See: “An organized being is thus not a mere 
machine [i.e., a watch], for that has only a motive power, while the organized being possesses in itself a formative power” (Kant, 2002a, 
CJ, 5:374).
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ral being and consequently is conditioned, while, as we saw 
earlier, the main chara eristic of the final end is that it is un-
conditioned. In other words, the final end is, by its very defi-
nition, absolute and total, and therefore cannot be embodied 
in nature or in a natural being, such as man. Moreover, the 
systematicity of nature per se does not give its existence any 
meaning, and therefore man, as the last link in the purposive-
ness of nature, cannot simultaneously constitute the valida-
tion of that same nature. Yet Kant gives man a key role as 
an ultimate end of nature towards the final end. For precisely 
human ability to grasp ourselves as the ultimate end of nature 
leads us to think about its final end: 
As the sole being on earth who has reason, 
and thus a capacity to set voluntary ends 
for himself, he is certainly the titular lord of 
nature, and, if nature is regarded as a tele-
ological system, then it is his vocation to be 
the ultimate end of nature; but always only 
conditionally, that is, subject to the condi-
tion that he has the understanding and the 
will to give to nature and to himself a re-
lation to an end that can be sufficient for 
itself independently of nature, which can 
thus be a final end, which, however, must 
not be sought in nature at all (Kant, 2002a, 
CJ, 5:431). 
The explanation lies in the assertion that only when we 
think about ourselves reflectively, by giving ourselves the prin-
ciple of purposiveness, do we have the possibility to reflect on 
nature and to think of it, too, in terms of a system of ends. 
Kant stresses the fact that this reflection necessarily leads be-
yond that purposive system of nature. For it is only in light 
of a higher end than nature, to which nature is subordinate, 
that we can give that nature teleological meaning and identify 
ourselves as the ultimate link in its chain. Stated differently, 
it emerges that the ultimate end of nature in fact prepares the 
ground for the realization of its final end.
Kant clarifies this by asserting that the role of the ulti-
mate end is “to prepare [man] for what he himself must do 
in order to be a final end” (Kant, 2002a, CJ, 5:431). That is, 
the idea of man as the ultimate end of nature contains an ad-
ditional idea, namely, that the final purpose of man is to free 
himself from nature and to act according to a purely rational 
motive: the moral principle. It should be noted that Kant does 
not maintain that man as he is given in the present consti-
tutes the final end. Rather, he is referring to a future situation 
preparing man “for what he himself must do” (Kant, 2002a, 
CJ, 5:431, emphasis mine). In other words, man in his pres-
ent natural state can serve solely as an ultimate end of nature. 
In order for him to also be its final end he must act “under 
moral laws” (Kant, 2002a, CJ, 5:448-9), as Kant asserts fur-
ther on in reference to the ideal of HG that human reason im-
poses, as noted, as a final end on nature as a whole. The point 
is that, as long as man is viewed as a rational being who can 
act according to moral principles independently of nature, he 
does not count only as part of conditioned nature.
I would like to address man’s freedom to act inde-
pendently of nature from two different yet interconnected 
per ectives. One is the pra ical per ective, which sets the 
idea of culture as an ultimate end that constitutes the ground 
for the final end. For culture allows man to shape nature itself 
as an end according to the ends that he freely sets on himself. 
The second per ective is that of the moral ideal, which seeks 
to examine what man can and must do as a rational being, 
a ing independently of nature in order to reshape nature as 
a moral system. I will now examine these two per ectives 
and will pose the question: how can the idea of culture as the 
ultimate end of natural order direct man towards the moral 
ideal of HG?
Culture and Moral Ideal
Kant describes culture as man’s ability in general to set 
ends for himself. I previously noted that man cannot serve 
as an ultimate end of nature if he is not capable of simulta-
neously directing nature towards its final end. This means 
that man must direct his own existence purposively by freely 
determining his a ions. Culture is the tool that assists him 
in this, because it does not describe any  ecific goal or end. 
Rather, it allows man to freely direct his a ions, by allowing 
him “to feel an aptitude for higher ends, which lie hidden in 
us” (Kant, 2002a, CJ, 5:434). Kant distinguishes here between 
culture and happiness as two natural ends of man and asserts 
that while happiness “is the matter of all of [man’s] ends on 
earth” (Kant, 2002a, CJ, 5:431),14 culture constitutes the for-
mal condition for man to freely set ends for himself, that is, to 
use nature without being dependent on it. 
In fact, Kant sets culture as a natural end from a general 
teleological per ective, that is, as an end whose role it is to 
allow men in general to think about their moral development, 
both as individuals and as part of the human community, by 
developing their ability, as said, to set themselves ends that are 
not conditional on nature. ‘Ability’ here refers to man’s power 
to structure himself as an ultimate end of nature by means of 
culture. “But”, says Kant, “not every kind of culture is adequate 
for this ultimate aim of nature” (Kant, 2002a, CJ, 5:431).  
In fact, Kant seeks to point to an inner division that the term 
‘culture’ requires and, to this end, distinguishes between what 
he terms “culture of skill” [Geschicklichkeit] and what he terms 
“culture of discipline” [Kultur der Zucht] (Kant, 2002a, CJ, 
5:431-432). The former refers to the way man structures his 
external surroundings materially, that is, to the way he devel-
14 In the context of HG Kant again emphasizes happiness as the sum of all of man’s natural ends. There, the stress is on our desire for 
happiness as a natural human interest – in addition to morality, which is purely rational interest – without which HG as a moral ideal is 
not complete.  
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ops means to satisfy his desires in order to increase his happi-
ness and well-being (the term ‘culture’ is here used in the basic 
sense that we today ascribe to it). The latter, in contrast, does 
not refer to systems that man imposes on the external world. 
Rather, it refers to that which develops the internal freedom 
of man, namely, the manner in which he sets ends for himself 
on the basis of reason alone. 
The main point here is that, in order to develop our 
humanity according to the ends of reason, we must develop 
the two kinds of culture – of skill and of discipline – simul-
taneously. This is because the first is responsible for promot-
ing our end-setting in general as natural beings, while the 
role of the second is to perfect and refine these natural ends 
according to the ends required by reason. Stated differently, 
culture as a whole gradually separates man from his imme-
diate ends, which are influenced, among other things, by his 
sensual nature, in order to make “room for the development 
of humanity” (Kant, 2002a, CJ, 5:433). It can be said that cul-
ture creates a kind of human who is capable of controlling 
her natural impulses and desires, on the one hand, while, on 
the other, simultaneously developing new kind of desires that 
are defined by culture itself. In other words, culture helps man 
to free himself from dependency on ends dictated to him by 
his sensual nature while allowing him to set new higher ends 
within the boundaries of that culture. Kant goes on to assert:
Beautiful arts and sciences […] make human 
beings, if not morally better, at least better 
mannered for society, very much reduce the 
tyranny of sensible tendencies, and prepare 
humans for a sovereignty in which reason 
alone shall have power (Kant, 2002a, CJ, 
5:433).
It is important to note that culture in itself (see: “beauti-
ful arts and sciences”) does not represent the moral vocation 
of man. At the same time, Kant emphasizes that, without cul-
ture, man would not have the ability to free himself from the 
heteronomy of his natural inclinations and to independently 
set ends for himself.
The question arises: if nature in itself cannot lead man 
to the moral end, but only to culture as an ultimate end of 
nature, how can we continue to imagine the final end from 
this position? Put differently, how can man bridge the gap be-
tween culture as the ultimate end of nature and the final end 
as the moral ideal of HG? I would like to suggest that the an-
swer to this question finds expression in the form of reflective 
judgment. By this I mean the way man reshapes nature by set-
ting ends, albeit not by dogmatically defining ends in nature 
by way of determinative judgments but, rather, by means of 
his ability to think critically, by using reflection, about the way 
he himself sets ends in nature.15
Kant asserts that, although the ends that culture sets 
are also connected with nature, much like determinative 
judgments that set objects in nature, thereby enabling it, 
the ends that culture sets do not derive directly from nature. 
In other words, culture is not a condition that constitutes ex-
perience. Rather, it has the form of a regulative principle, “a 
guide for the power of judgment in reflection on the prod-
ucts of nature” (Kant, 2002a, CJ, 5:399). The fact that culture 
serves as a demonstration of a regulative principle is reflected 
in the way nature regulates the subject to make judgments 
that are essential for beings like him, that is, natural beings 
endowed with reason who seek to give their a ions meaning. 
This means that culture uncovers something essential in the 
nature of man that does not find expression when he acts ac-
cording to his sensual nature alone, namely, the human need 
to give teleological form to nature as a whole, including to 
man himself as an ultimate end of nature “appropriate to our 
cognitive faculties” (Kant, 2002a, CJ, 5:399). The main point 
here is not the revelation of an internal purposiveness in na-
ture itself but, rather, the self-awareness of the human striving 
to systematize nature. It emerges that the way we recognize 
ourselves as possessing moral ability, that is, as having the as-
piration to realize HG, is conditional on our recognition of 
ourselves as cultural beings, namely, on self-awareness of our 
potential to promote our ability to freely set ends in nature.
It is important to note that I do not mean to assert that 
the ideal of the HG can be positively portrayed in this man-
ner as a concrete moral goal. Rather, my assertion is that the 
development of our abilities by means of culture enables us 
to recognize ourselves as possessing moral ability within our 
limited existence in nature. It follows that cultural pra ice 
itself (through the ability to freely set ends) creates in us the 
need to raise the question of the moral ideal and whether we 
have reason to hope that it can indeed be realized within the 
empirical world. 
In the final section I will examine that human need to 
provide a highest moral ideal end as a need that points to 
human limitation, rather than to an ability to arrive at that 
final end in pra ice, while arguing that the recognition of 
that limitation is the ground for hope in the moral ideal.16 
My point is that this recognition is involved in our reflective 
use of imagination, which provides man with a self-represen-
tation that presents both human limitation as a need to give 
15 In sections §§ 74-75 Kant once again raises his distinction between determinative and reflective judgments, as presented in the first sec-
tion of the book in relation to aesthetic judgments. The difference is that in the teleological context he calls the first “dogmatic” and the 
latter “critical”. This distinction is relevant here since the emphasis is on the fact that Kant’s claims regarding culture and human natural 
inclinations must be considered within the context of moral teleology as ‘critical’, i.e. as involving reflection (Kant, 2002a, CJ, 5:395-401).
16 A very interesting interpretation of reflective judgment as a form of judgment that indicates limitation as a basis for hope in the moral 
ideal can be found in Eli Friedlander, who argues that the moral ideal makes us feel our limitations in the sense that it presents to us 
our dispositions in a certain order: organized as a whole, and consequently we judge ourselves by feeling our limitations in respect to 
it (Friedlander, 2015, p. 80, 110).
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teleological form to nature as a whole and human moral abil-
ity as the capacity to freely set ends for ourselves, the capacity 
for culture for that matter, as a form of a ivity that reshapes 
nature. I wish to argue that this dual self-representation inev-
itably leads to reflection on the actual human condition vis-à-
vis the perfect human moral condition, i.e. HG, which in turn 
demonstrates its realizability through a structure of hope.  
Limitation as a Ground for Hope
Kant describes man’s need for a highest end, one that 
combines all his other ends as a whole under one principle, as a 
necessary outcome of the limitation of human pra ical reason. 
In Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (Rel.) he writes:
[The idea of HG] meets our natural need, 
which would otherwise be a hindrance to 
moral resolve, to think for all our doings and 
nondoings taken as a whole some sort of fi-
nal end […] it is one of the inescapable lim-
itations of human beings and of their prac-
tical faculty of reason […] to be concerned 
in every action with its result, seeking some-
thing in it that might serve them as an end 
(Kant, 1998, Rel., 6:5-7n, emphases mine).
Kant asserts that all rational human a ivity, without ex-
ception, is intrinsically directed towards systematic progress 
and the creation of totality. In other words, even when the ab-
solute condition of the will is fulfilled, reason demands, all the 
same, to generalize all of man’s a ions towards one highest 
end: HG.17 Kant calls this human need for totality “one of the 
inescapable limitations of human beings” (Kant, 1998, Rel., 
6:5-7n), in the sense that it is a necessary limitation of human 
pra ical reason. Kant’s argument is that man is a goal-direct-
ed-being by his very nature and, therefore, inevitably directs 
himself to the question regarding the final end of his conduct. 
This does not mean that HG constitutes the moral motive 
but, rather, that human beings necessarily imagine its possi-
bility when they commit themselves to an a ion on moral 
grounds. As noted above, this does not refer to the ability to 
provide any material embodiment to HG but, rather, to the 
possibility to give it meaning as a regulative idea that can be 
used as a guide for a ion.18
Two main, interconnected matters arise here. The first 
relates to the human need to direct all a ions as a whole to-
wards one ideal end, while the second relates to the need to 
grant objective reality to that ideal end in order to be able to 
act according to it in pra ice. These two matters simultane-
ously point to, on the one hand, the limitations of human na-
ture – due to the very need to set an ideal end in the first place 
– and, on the other, man’s recognition of these limitations, with 
this very recognition constituting the ground for hope in that 
final end as a real possibility. The question that arises is: Why 
is it precisely man’s recognition of self-limitation in empirical 
nature that opens up the possibility to think of a moral ideal 
that goes beyond everything that can be recognized or known 
empirically? And, further, how can that moral ideal be justi-
fied at the pra ical level of human a ions? The answer I pro-
pose relies, as stated, on the principles of reflective judgment as 
a form of judgment that does not determine HG but, rather, 
demonstrates that it can only have meaning with regard to the 
purposeful application of man’s subjective cognitive abilities.19
Kant contends that human understanding is of a  e-
cial kind, since it allows us to relate to organisms in nature as 
though they stem from a representation of ends, by means 
of which we make the unifying lawfulness of nature possi-
ble.20 The main point is that this is not a matter of a mere 
 eculative option; rather, the discursive structure of our 
mind compels us to think of the totality of nature by means 
of this form of systematic representation, where the whole 
constitutes the end of its parts. In other words, due to the 
discursivity of our understanding, we are unable to think 
of nature other than by means of teleological principles.21 
17 See: “Pure reason, whether considered in its speculative or in its practical use, always […] demands the absolute totality of conditions 
for a given conditioned. […] it seeks the unconditioned totality of the object of pure practical reason, under the name of the highest 
good” (Kant, 2002b, CPR, 5:107).
18 A similar idea can be found in Yirmiahu Yovel’s interpretation of HG as a regulatory idea of history. According to Yovel, HG does not point 
to a transcendental world that is beyond the empirical world. Rather, it indicates two states of affairs of the same world: one that is given 
and another that is ideal. According to this interpretation, HG becomes the end of the world from the perspective of human history, since 
it is the perfect state of reality in which people actually live and act (Yovel, 1980, p. 29-80, 158-200). I share with Yovel the motivation to 
give HG moral meaning within the empirical space of human activities. My addition is the prominence of both imagination and reflection.
19 Cf. Kneller (2009, p. 50-52). Jane Kneller presents a similar interpretation yet from the opposite direction. She argues that our moral 
imperative to realize HG in practice already assumes that we have the ability to imagine that such realization is possible and that it is 
possible within our cognitive abilities.
20 See Kant’s (2002a) discussion in CJ, sections §§ 76-77
21 Here the issue of limitation arises from another perspective by raising the possibility of an understanding that is different from ours, 
i.e. an intuitive understanding that does not have the need for the concept of purposiveness since it does not distinguish between reality 
and possibility, and therefore is only an idea. It is important to note that Kant does not claim that this “different understanding” exists, 
but that the discursive nature of our cognition imposes upon us both the idea of  “different understanding” and of thinking in terms of 
natural purposiveness as two essential methodological assumptions that involve one another. In other words, in order to understand the 
concept of natural purposiveness as derived from our limited discursive understanding (it is limited because it must think of nature in 
terms of purposiveness) we need only the possibility of non-discursive understanding (i.e., God), that is, an ideal one. I will not go into 
this argument here as it requires independent discussion. For further discussion, see Beiser (2006).
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HG emerges, too, as an essential presupposition that follows, 
as noted, from the human need to set a final moral end that 
comprehends the totality of a ions in pra ice. Human lim-
itation, in this re ect, is demonstrated in pra ice in man’s 
ability to use his reason by reflecting on that limitation. 
Kant argues that man must ask himself in what manner his 
reason can be used without setting ends, and his conclusion 
is that without a purposive structure no use can be made of 
reason (neither pra ical nor theoretical). 
With this in mind, and returning to the idea of cul-
ture as an ultimate end of man that prepares him “for what 
he himself must do in order to be a final end” (Kant, 2002a, 
CJ, 5:431), it can be said that culture involves recognition of 
human limitation precisely because it entails reflection on a 
representation of the structure of human progress towards an 
ideal final end as a natural human desire. Put differently, my 
claim is that HG is not something that can be represented 
in intuition as any other pra ical end that we might pose to 
ourselves. Rather, it is something that can only be portrayed 
in thought as having the form of an end and it is articulated 
through culture as the human ability to freely set ends in na-
ture. Now, because HG is a moral end, man is obliged to strive 
to realize it despite, as stated above, his inability to represent 
it intuitively. It is here, I would like to argue, that the reflective 
use of imagination takes place.
It should be stressed here that I am not pointing at any 
direct representation that we create in our imagination, in 
the sense of the ability to give embodiment or realization to 
HG. Rather, I am talking of the reflective use of imagination, 
which gives us a criterion solely for a reflective assessment of 
how close, or how far, we are to, or from, realizing that ideal. 
It emerges that our very striving towards HG as a final end 
points to our human limitation with regard to it, on the one 
hand, while, on the other, the representation of this unavoid-
able self-limitation that we create in our imagination enables 
us to give an articulation to that striving in the form of the gap 
between us and that final end.
It follows that our very recognition of human limitation 
points to the fact that there will always be a gap between our 
present state and HG. This gap is a necessary chara eristic 
of the manner in which human beings think of HG as an ideal 
final moral end. Consequently, given the fact that the moral 
ideal cannot be fully realized in human life and yet we have 
a moral duty to promote it, the only way of concretizing it is 
through our recognition of self-limitation as constituting the 
ground for striving for that ideal. In other words, recognition 
of human limitation is the preliminary condition for human 
freedom to set ourselves a totally rational moral ideal within 
the empirical world and to re-regulate our a ions according 
to it as a real possibility, in spite of our awareness of the fact 
that we will never be able to completely attain that moral ide-
al in our present life.22
The conclusion I want to point to, in this re ect, is that 
the hope in the possibility of realizing HG is demonstrated 
through the way that we choose to assume it, in contrast to the 
thing that we assume. The emphasis is on the way we choose 
to see ourselves as morally capable beings. It can be asserted 
that we are in need of a form of judgment that clarifies the 
recognition of our limitation as beings who also act according 
to natural desires and inclinations, in order to create the basis 
for hope in our rational abilities to act according to pra i-
cal reason. I am referring, as noted, to the form of reflective 
judgment that is not directed to determining the object, that 
is to say, I am not talking of the possibility of knowing or rec-
ognizing the moral ideal as a substantial end but, rather, of the 
ability of the subject to presuppose it as a rational principle 
according to which it is possible to act. In other words, the 
sense in which I wish to e ablish the connection between the 
principle of reflective judgment and the moral ideal is in the 
idea that through the structure of purposiveness, or the ability 
to think nature teleologically, one can think of the moral ideal 
too as a pra ical possibility.
In conclusion, it can be said that although HG cannot 
be realized in pra ice, the hope in its possibility remains an 
essential condition for our ability to act in light of that ideal 
in the empirical world. This is as part of man’s recognition of 
himself as an ultimate end of nature who possesses the pos-
sibility of freely setting himself ends in that nature. I wish 
to point to the fact that this possibility is involved in the 
reflective use of imagination, clarifying man’s recognition of 
his limitation while simultaneously allowing him to imagine 
himself in a manner that extends his given transcendental 
conditions, in so far as reflection presents man’s abilities to 
regulate his conduct also according to his pra ical reason 
and therefore constitutes a ground for hope.23 This use of 
imagination sets the ultimate end of nature as part of the 
general final end, thereby meeting the need to supply cul-
tural and teleological explanations of ourselves as striving 
towards this final end, even if, as stated, this end cannot be 
positively imagined.
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